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EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In society you will not find health, but in nature. Unless our
feet at least stood in the midst of nature, all our faces would be
pale and livid. Society is always diseased, and the best is the most
so. There is no scent in it so wholesome as that of the pines, nor
any fragrance so penetrating and restorative as the life-everlasting
in high pastures.
-Henry David Thoreau1
Since Thoreau wrote those words in 1842 that portion of the
nation's land remaining "in nature" has steadily diminished. Old cities
have expanded, and new ones have been created. Vast networks of
highways, utilized by millions of automobiles, wind their way across
the country. Complex systems of utility lines and pipelines, which pro-
vide needed electricity, natural gas, oil, and communication, crisscross
America. These developments, however, have not been without costs.
As Justice William 0. Douglas has remarked: "Virgin stands of timber
are virtually gone.... The wilderness disappears each year under the
ravages of bulldozers, highway builders, and men in search of metals
that will make them rich."2
As the wilderness retreats, its lands are often appropriated without
due regard for maintaining environmental quality;3 the condemnation
1 Thoreau, Natural History of Massachusetts, 3 DIAL 19, 20-21 (1842).
2 W. DOUGLAS, PoINrs Or REBELLION 50-51 (1970).
3 Highway planning exemplifies this disregard of environmental quality. A noted
environmental architect, Ian McHarg, has remarked:
In highway design, the problem is reduced to the simplest and most common-
place terms: traffic, volume, design speed, capacity, pavements, structures,
horizontal and vertical alignment. These considerations are married to a
thoroughly spurious cost-benefit formula and the consequences of this institu-
tionalized myopia are seen in the scars upon the land and in the cities.
Who are as arrogant, as unmoved by public values and concerns as highway
commissions and engineers? . . . Give us your beautiful rivers and valleys, and
we will destroy them: Jones Falls in Baltimore, the Schuylkill River in Philadel-
phia, Rock Creek in Washington, the best beauty of Staten Island, the Stony
Brook-Millstone Valley near Princeton.
I. McHARG, DESIGN wITH NATuRE 31 (1969).
There seems to be little debate as to the existence of this problem; rather, argument
concerns where to place the blame. McHarg has nominated the highway commissions as
the most oblivious to environmental considerations:
If one seeks a single example of an assertion of simple-minded single purpose,
the analytical rather than the synthetic view and indifference to natural process
-indeed an anti-ecological view-then the highway and its creators leap to mind.
There are other aspirants who vie to deface shrines and desecrate sacred cows,
but surely it is the highway commissioner and engineer who most passionately
embrace insensitivity and philistinism as way of life and profession.
Id.
Justice Douglas, while conceding that "[t]he Public Roads Administration has few
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of land for highways, 4 utility lines,5 and pipelines6 presents vivid evi-
dence of this lack of concern. Changes in the law of eminent domain,
however, would do much to make environmental needs a determinative
factor in condemnation proceedings.
I
THE STATUS OF THE LAW
A. Eminent Domain in General
Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public
use.7 Although the United States Constitution does not expressly grant
this power to either the federal or state governments, the Supreme
Court has held that the power of eminent domain is inherent in
sovereignty and requires no constitutional recognition. 8 The Court
conservation standards," has selected "[t]he Army Corps of Engineers [as] public enemy
number one." Douglas, The Public Be Damned, 16 PLAYBOY, July 1969, at 143, 182, 143.
He comments, however, that "[i]t is not easy to pick out public enemy number one from
among our Federal agencies, for many of them are notorious despoilers and the competi-
tion is great for that position." Id. at 143.
4 "Hundreds of trout streams have been destroyed by highway engineers and their
faulty plans." W. DOUGLAS, supra note 2, at 51. "The design of a highway, as well as its
location, may be ruinous to economic, aesthetic, scenic, recreational, or health interests."
Id. at 85.
For a recent example of the disregard of environmental considerations by highway
planners-in this instance in derogation of a statutory duty, see Citizens To Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 39 U.S.L.W. 4287 (U.S. March 2, 1971). Writing in a
concurring opinion, Justice Black stated: "I regret that I am compelled to conclude . . .
this record contains not one word to indicate that the Secretary raised even a finger to
comply with the command of Congress." Id. at 4293.
5 Concern for the aesthetic environment no doubt prompted a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Operations to recommend to the Department of the
Interior that in granting rights of way for utility lines it should require all applicants to
prove affirmatively (1) that the proposed right of way is in accord with the public interest,
and (2) that in the event the right of way is harmful to the environment, there is no
feasible and prudent alternative and all possible measures to minimize the resulting harm
have been taken or are planned. See H.R. R-P. No. 1083, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
6 An example of the disregard for environmental quality occurred in New Jersey in
1967, when a utility company succeeded in condemning wildlife refuge and conservation
land for the construction of a pipeline. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves,
Inc., 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967). Experts had characterized the land as "the finest
inland, natural fresh water wetland in the entire Northeastern United States and its
accessibility to the Metropolitan Area makes it even more valuable." Texas E. Trans-
mission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 270, 225 A.2d 130, 135 (1966). The
land was condemned despite expert testimony that it would result in damage to the best
groves of trees, subsoils, springs, and streams. Id.
7 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 616 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
8 "The right of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public
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has also found an implied grant of eminent domain within the fifth
amendment.9 This power to take private property for public use rests
in both the state and federal governments, 10 which may exercise it
directly or delegate it.11
The exercise of eminent domain, however, is not without restraint.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments preclude the deprivation of
uses, appertains to every independent government. It requires no constitutional recogni-
tion; it is an attribute of sovereignty." Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
See also United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946); Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264
U.S. 472, 480 (1924).
American scholars have traditionally regarded eminent domain as inherent in
sovereignty. Chancellor Kent, for example, wrote in 1827 that "[t]he right of emifient
domain, or inherent sovereign power, it is admitted by all publicists, gives to the legislature
the control of private property for public uses .... " 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 275 (1827).
See also T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONs 524 (1868). International
legal scholars have reached the same condusion. See, e.g., E. DE VATTEL, TnE LAw OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAw 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916); cf. 1 H. GROTius,
DE JuRE BFr.TI Ac PACIS 102 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925); 2 C. VAN BYNKERSHOEX, QUAFSTIONUM
JURIs PUBLC 218-24 ('. Frank transl. 1930).
9 The Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of [eminent domain]
beyond what may justly be implied from the express grants. The fifth amendment
contains a provision that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. What is that but an implied assertion, that, on
making just compensation, it may be taken?
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
10 [T]he right of every State to authorize the appropriation of every description
of property for a public use is one of those inherent powers which belong to state
governments, without which they could not well perform their great functions.
It is a power not surrendered to the United States ....
Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 890, 400 (1912). See also Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875).
The federal government may also take property by eminent domain. "The right of
eminent domain inheres in the Federal Government by virtue of its sovereignty .... "
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937). "[T]he United States may exercise
the right of eminent domain, even within the limits of the several States, for purposes
necessary to the execution of the powers granted to the general government by the
Constitution." Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 656 (1890).
11 Today, statutes commonly authorize the delegation of the power of eminent
domain. This delegation is not limited to governmental agencies, political subdivisions,
and municipalities, but may also be extended to private persons and corporations. E.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1964) provides:
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot
acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the
compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way . . . it may acquire the
same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain ....
Such delegations of the power of eminent domain have been held constitutional.
"The property may be appropriated by an act of the legislature, or the power of appropri-
ating it may be delegated to private corporations, to be exercised by them in the execution
of works in which the public is interested." Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406
(1878).
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property without due process of law.12 It is thus possible for the owner
of property to defeat condemnation in eminent domain proceedings.
To do so, the owner must prove the taking of his property arbitrary
and capricious.1 3 This is extremely difficult because the condemnee has
the burden of demonstrating to the satisfaction of the court that the
taking is arbitrary. A showing that there exists a viable alternative to
the taking will not suffice.14 Indeed, the condemnee must often prove
fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse to defeat a proposed taking.' Ab-
sent a showing of such palpable arbitrariness, the condemnee is afforded
little relief.
B. The "Prior Public Use" Doctrine-An Exception
As a general rule, property already devoted to a public use cannot
be condemned for another public use without express legislative au-
thorization, 6 although in many jurisdictions property devoted to one
12 "No person shall . . .be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"No State shall ... deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 Southern Pac. Land Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 161, 162 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967); United States ex rel. TVA v. 0.08 Acre of Land, 246 F. Supp.
408, 410 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 200
So. 2d 428, 433-34 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Housing & Redev. Authority v. Minneapolis
Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 14-15, 104 N.W.2d 864, 874 (1960); Vance County v.
Royster, 271 N.C. 53, 60, 155 S.E.2d 790, 795 (1967); State v. Homer, 121 W. Va. 75, 81, 1
S.E.2d 486, 489 (1939).
14 "'The mere fact that another location would be equally as feasible, practicable, and
desirable would not of itself be sufficient to force the company to change to such location
and abandon the location selected.'" Miller v. Georgia Power Co., 222 Ga. 239, 241, 149
S.E.2d 479, 481 (1966), quoting Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 131 Ga.
129, 133-34, 62 S.E. 52, 54 (1908). See also Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 485, 489 (W.D.S.C. 1950); United States v. 11.355 Acres of Land, 51 F. Supp.
752, 754 (N.D. Tex. 1943); Southwest La. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Simon, 207 So. 2d
546, 552 (La. Ct. App. 1967), appeal denied, 252 La. 104, 209 So. 2d 37 (1968).
15 "'[Tjhe general rule is that the courts will not disturb [eminent domain] in the
absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion.'" Swenson v. Milwaukee County,
266 Wis. 129, 132, 63 N.W.2d 103, 105 (1954), quoting 18 An. JuR. Eminent Domain § 108,
at 735 (1938). See also Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901, 907 (10th Cir. 1965); United
States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534, 536 (3d Cir. 1957); Simmonds v. United States,
199 F.2d 305, 306-07 (9th Cir. 1952); United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 892 (7th Cir.
1940); Cemetery Co. v. Warren School Township, 236 Ind. 171, 188, 139 N.E.2d 538, 546
(1957); Moore Mill & Lumber Co. v. Foster, 216 Ore. 204, 244, 336 P.2d 39, 57 (1959);
Bookhart v. Central Elec. Power Cooperative, 222 S.C. 289, 294, 72 S.E.2d 576, 578 (1952).
16 "The general rule is that property already devoted to a public use cannot be
taken for another public use under the power of eminent domain, where the latter taking
will totally destroy or materially interfere with the first use." Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d
800, 816 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 869 (1930). See also United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 196 F.2d 657, 661 (4th Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 344
(1953); United States v. Southern Power Co., 31 F.2d 852, 856 (4th Cir. 1929).
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public use may be condemned for another public use of superior rank.17
A condemnee who is able to establish that his land is devoted to a prior
public use may thus be immune from condemnation. Even if his juris-
diction allows the condemnation of one public use for a superior use,
the condemnee will not have to meet the difficult burden of proving
arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the condemnor, but may
be able to invoke a balancing test to determine whether the proposed
taking is more necessary to the public good than the retention of the
existing public use.18
For property to be held for a public use, however, there must be
a legal obligation to maintain it as such; a voluntary assumption of
17 The fact that the land sought to be condemned is now being used for public
purposes does not as a matter of law exempt the property from condemnation
for another public purpose. If the purpose for which the site is sought is of
superior rank with respect to public necessity to the public use now being made
of it, the [condemnor] should prevail.
United States v. Certain Land, 55 F. Supp. 555, 557 (ID. Mo. 1944), aff'd, 151 F.2d 881
(8th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 230 (1946). See also State Highway
Comm'n v. Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 224, 140 A. 835, 886 (Ch. 1928); Fry v. Jackson, 264
S.W. 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 430-31,
107 P. 199, 202-03 (1910).
A superior use is one by which the public interest would be better served. See 2 J.
LEwis, TRE.ATis ON TE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 440 (3d ed. 1909); note 18 infra.
That property already devoted to a public use may be condemned for a superior
public use dearly appears to be the more accepted rule today. For an analysis of recent
cases on this point, see ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMITrE ON CONDEMNATION AND CON-
DEMNATION PROCEDURE 9-10 (1970); ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMIT=rE ON CONDEMNATION
AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE 17-18 (1969); ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CON-
DEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE 23-26 (1968).
18 See note 17 and accompanying text supra; Cf. 2 J. Lxvws, supra note 17, § 440, at
794-96 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted):
The presumption [when authority to condemn property for any purpose is given
in general terms] is against the right to take property which is already devoted
to public use. This presumption may be overcome by showing a reasonable
necessity for the property desired, as compared with its necessity and importance
to the use to which it is already devoted. . . As to the degree of necessity
which must exist . . . the better opinion is that it must be a reasonable one.
Whether any general rule can be laid down as to what will constitute a reasonable
necessity, may be doubted. But we should say that there was a reasonable necessity
for the taking where the public interests would be better subserved thereby ....
Some jurisdictions forbid the condemnation of land already devoted to public use
unless the condemnation will create a more necessary public use. See, e.g., Aiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1112 (1956):
Before property may be taken, it shall appear that:
(1) The use to which the property is to be applied is a use authorized by law.
(2) The taking is necessary to such use.
(3) If the property is already appropriated to some public use, the public
use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
For a similar provision see IDAHo CODE § 7-704(3) (1948). Cf. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1240(3)
(West Supp. 1971).
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public service that may be abandoned at any time is not exempted. 19
Therefore, only government-owned lands20 or lands. held by private
persons21 under enforceable trusts for the benefit of the public are able
to qualify under the prior public use doctrine.
The doctrine is important in reducing takings of environmentally
significant land when the land is held as a public trust, but there is a
large amount of such land owned by private persons under circum-
stances that do not qualify as a prior public use. These landowners
must meet the difficult burden of proving that the condemnation of
their land is arbitrary or capricious.
II
SOME PROPOSALS
A. Legislative Enactment
Absent fraud, manifest abuse, or bad faith, land with environ-
mental significance may be condemned as readily as other land. Such
areas may be afforded some protection from condemnation by legisla-
tion. Two approaches are possible.
First, the prior public use doctrine may be extended to owners of
environmentally significant land by legislation. If the condemnee is
able to establish the environmental significance of his land,22 and fur-
ther, that significant environmental damage will result from the
proposed taking, the law would extend the benefits of the doctrine to
the condemnee.
A second approach is to require the condemnor to prove either
that no adverse environmental effect is likely to result from the project
or that there exists no feasible and prudent alternative to the proposed
19 "To exempt property from condemnation under a general grant of the power
of eminent domain, it is not enough that it has been voluntarily devoted by its
owner to a public or semi-public use. If the use by the public is permissive and
may be abandoned at any time, the property is not so held as to be exempt. The
test of whether or not property has been devoted to public use is what the owner
must do, not what he may choose to do."
Bailey v. Anderson, 182 Va. 70, 74, 27 S.E.2d 914, 915-16, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 799 (1943),
quoting 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 94, at 720 (1938). See also Diamond Jo Line
Steamers v. Davenport, 114 Iowa 432, 434, 87 N.W. 399, 400 (1901); Vermont Hydro-Elec.
Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 149, 112 A. 223, 225-26 (1921).
20 This would include lands held by the sovereign (i.e., state or federal land), by
government subdivisions (e.g., counties), and by municipalities.
21 This would include not only land owned by individuals but also lands owned by
associations, corporations, and other business enterprises.
22 See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
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taking, and that all reasonable steps have been taken to minimize ill
effects. 23 A variation of this approach is suggested by the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act of 1970,24 under which a plaintiff may
halt an activity of a defendant, including condemnation of land, by
tendering evidence that the activity is likely to be hazardous to the
environment.25 The defendant may contest the issue of environmental
damage or may establish an affirmative defense by demonstrating that
there is no feasible alternative available and that the activity is "con-
sistent with the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in
light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural
resources . "26 The initial burden of proof, however, is on the
plaintiff.
Although the Michigan legislation is quite significant in safeguard-
ing environmental interests, it is preferable to place the burden of
proving the absence of environmental damage on the condemnor. Thus,
a presumption of environmental damage would be created in the
absence of proof to the contrary. The imposition of the burden of
23 See, e.g., Federal Aid-Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1970); Department of
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. V, 1970). This approach has been incorpo-
rated into several proposed laws and regulations that would safeguard environmental
quality. See, e.g., H.R. 19782, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Section 101(d)(2) of the bill,
entitled the "Corps of Engineers Environmental Policy Act of 1970," would forbid the
Secretary of the Army to approve any application for a public works project involving
the Corps unless, inter alia, "either no adverse environmental effect is likely to result from
such project, or there exists no feasible and prudent alternative to such effect and all
reasonable steps have been taken to minimize such effect." H.R. REP. No. 1088, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 21 (1970), recommends to the Secretary of the Interior that he require all applicants
for rights of way to prove affirmatively that (1) the proposed right of way is in accord with
the public interest, and (2) if there will be harm to the environment, there is no feasible
and prudent alternative.
24 Micn. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Current Material 1970). For an analysis of
this act, see Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 4 J. LAW RExORm 121
(1970).
25 [A]ny person... may maintain an action . . . for declaratory and equitable
relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, . . . any person,
partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity for the
protection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(1) (Current Material 1970).
26 When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima fade showing that the
conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air,
water or other natural resources or the public trust therein, the defendant may
rebut the prima fade showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary.
The defendant may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no
feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that such conduct
is consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light
of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources from
pollution, impairment or destruction.
Id. § 14.528(208)(1).
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proof on the condemnor would be dispositive if neither the condemnor
nor condemnee were able to prove the absence or probability of en-
vironmental damage. More important, the condemnor would be
forced to view all projects in environmental terms from their inception
-always cognizant that he might have to prove the absence of environ-
mental damage.
B. The Role of the Judiciary
Although the problem is amenable to solution by legislation, it is
unrealistic to expect the federal government and the governments of
the fifty states to enact the necessary laws in the near future.27 Inquiry
into possible ways for the courts to deal with this environmental issue
is therefore warranted.28
The courts could enlarge the scope of the prior public use doctrine
to encompass land held by private parties, notwithstanding the absence
of an enforceable trust, when the landholder can prove that the land is
environmentally significant and that environmental damage will prob-
ably result from the condemnation. 29 Courts have heretofore refused to
27 While environmental protection legislation, such as the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act of 1970, is necessary and to be encouraged, the absence of any significant
environmental protection legislation in most states is indicative that the solution cannot
be left to the legislatures. See note 28 infra.
A possible drawback to legislation as the sole remedy for environmental problems
has been noted:
There is another danger inherent in continuing to attack the problem solely
through legislation. Widely publicized new legislation gives the appearance of
action without the substance. It lulls the public into a false confidence that
something is being done.
Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Government Account-
ability, 55 CoRNE .. L. RFv. 666, 671 (1970).
28 Attention is increasingly being focused on the judiciary as a mode of combatting
the decay of the environment. As one commentator has recently noted:
Public concern about environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the
courtroom. Private citizens, no longer willing to accede to the efforts of adminis-
trative agencies to protect the public interest, have begun to take the initiative
themselves. One dramatic result is a proliferation of lawsuits in which citizens,
demanding judicial recognition of their rights as members of the public, sue
the very governmental agencies which are supposed to be protecting the public
interest.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MicH. L. Rxv. 471, 473 (1970). Another has announced that "'environmental' litigation
[has] come into its own." Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in
LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970). Moreover, "[t]he number
of environmental lawsuits will undoubtedly multiply rapidly over the -course of the next
few years." Id.
29 Of course, the efficacy of this remedy depends upon the willingness of private
landholders to challenge condemnation proceedings when their environmentally significant
land is threatened. In some situations, however, third parties may be able to challenge
[Vol 56:651
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allow condemnees the benefit of the prior public use doctrine unless
the use is one "to which the public.., is legally entitled and to which
the owner is legally bound."30 The extension of the prior public use
doctrine, however, is not as radical a departure from the case law as it
might at first seem.31 Present law does not require the public employ-
ment of the land in the sense of access or direct use; it is sufficient if
the land is devoted to the advantage or benefit of the public.82 Just as
the public is harmed by the destruction of environmentally significant
land regardless of whether it is owned by a private or public landholder,
the public benefits from the continued, existence of environmentally
significant land regardless of ownership. Biotic communities and eco-
systems-the terrestrial jurisdictions of the ecologist-owe no allegiance
to the "metes and bounds" of deeds.33 The environmentally important
condemnation proceedings that threaten the integrity of the environment. See note 40
infra.
80 Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 89 N.J. Super. 1, 4, 213
A 2d 193, 195 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 48 NJ. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). See also note
19 and accompanying text supra.
81 A few courts have allowed private owners, not bound to maintain a public use,
the defense of prior public use. See, e.g., Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. New Haven, 43
Conn. 234 (1875) (private cemetery); County Bd. of Corm'rs v. Holliday, 182 S.C. 510, 189
S.E. 885 (1937) (church cemetery); cf. President & Fellows of Middlebury College v. Central
Power Corp., 101 Vt. 325, 143 A. 384 (1928) (private college). See also Brief for Appellant at
9-10, Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130
(1966), where the appellant argued (unsuccessfully) for the availability of the defense of
prior public use to a private landholder. For a discussion of that aspect of the case by
one of appellant's attorneys, see McCarter, The Case That Almost Was, 54 A.B.A.J.
1076 (1968).
32 Cf. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 532-33, 245 A2d 579. 586 (1968); Spahn v.
Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 104, 103 S.W.2d 651, 655 (1937); Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569,
592-94, 252 S.W. 404, 407-08 (1923); State v. Totowa Lumber & Supply Co., 96 N.J. Super.
115, 119-23, 232 A.2d 655, 658-59 (1967); State ex rel. Allerton Parking Corp. v. Cleveland, 4
Ohio App. 2d 57, 64-67, 211 N.E.2d 203, 208-09 (1965), aff'd, 6 Ohio St. 2d 165, 216 N.E.2d
876 (1966).
The courts have held, moreover, that what constitutes a public use will vary with the
changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government. As one court has noted,
"[w]hat constitutes a proper use will depend largely on the social needs of the times and
may change from generation to generation." City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 470,
109 A.2d 409, 411 (1954), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 972 (1955). See also Strickley v. Highland
Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906); Clendaniel v. Conrad, 26 Del. 549, 581-82,
83 A. 1036, 1046 (1912), error dismissed, 235 U.S. 712 (1914); Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler,
199 Ind. 95, 116-17, 155 N.E. 465, 472 (1927); State ex rel. Smith v. Kemp, 124 Kan. 716,
719-21, 261 P. 556, 557-58 (1927), error dismissed, 278 U.S. 191 (1929); State ex rel. Twin
City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 16-17, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (1920); Bowman
v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 24-25, 233 S.W.2d 26, 32-33 (1950); New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 340-41, 1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1936); Dornan v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 221, 200 A. 834, 840 (1938); State ex rel. Chelan Elec. Co.
v. Superior Ct., 142 Wash. 270, 276, 253 P. 115, 117 (1927).
83 As one ecologist has noted, "[tihe terrestrial ecosystem is not always presented in
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features of certain lands, such as forest or marsh, may be crucial to the
continued environmental "health" of other lands despite their legal
separateness and diverse ownership. When the interdependence of
many tracts of land within an ecological system is recognized, it is
quite obvious that the public may gain significant environmental bene-
fits from land even though it is privately owned.
The environmental significance of land and the likelihood that a
proposed condemnation will cause ecological damage are questions that
can only be answered on an ad hoc basis3 4 Nevertheless, the governing
principle should be that the best route or location is the one that pro-
vides the maximum social benefit and the least social cost.35 It is clear,
however, that the condemnation process has failed to consider the
ecological and social costs associated with the destruction of the environ-
ment.36 To be accurate, the cost-benefit analysis of planners and devel-
opers must include all of the costs, 37 not just the expense of purchase
and construction. The appraisal of non-economic costs, especially
environmental destruction, need not employ an altogether subjective
methodology. Several methods have been proposed for objectively
evaluating the relative environmental significance of an area,38 and the
availability of such methods indicates that the courts will be able to
consider the viability of alternative locations for condemnation.
An objection certain to be raised to the extension of the prior
so neat a package ...." Rowe, The Level-of-Integration Concept and Ecology, 42 ECOLOGY
420, 422 (1961). Rowe describes the boundaries that do delineate ecosystems as biota, soil,
and physiography. Id. at 425.
34 Cf. D. Lacate, The Role of Resource Inventories and Landscape Ecology in the
Highway Route Selection Process-A Case Study Using the Proposed Relocation of New York
State Route 13, Sept. 1, 1970 (unpublished thesis in the Cornell University Library). The
author notes that "[t]he development of a universally applicable set of criteria for highway
route selections" would not be feasible or realistic. Id. at 3.
36 I. McHARG, supra note 3, at 32.
36 Id. See also Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CoRNEJ.L
L. RFv. 707, 709 (1970). For further criticism of the cost-benefit analysis as applied to
environmental considerations, see Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost
Analysis, 6 NATuRAL REsoURCES J. 195 (1966).
37 Some of the frequently ignored social costs that are nevertheless important are
losses in (1) community values, (2) institutional values, (3) residential values, (4) scenic
values, (5) historic values, (6) recreational values, (7) surface water resources, (8) ground-
water resources, (9) forest resources, and (10) wildlife resources. I. McHAPG, supra note 3,
at 33.
88 McHarg has proposed a method by which one superimposes transparent overlays
on a map of the area, with each overlay shaded with respect to one environmental value,
such as forest resources. For a list of the values that McHarg includes, see note 37 supra.
McHarg uses three different shades to indicate the relative importance of the value; e.g.,
an excellent forest would be shaded the darkest shade, while a poor forest would be
shaded the lightest shade. D. Lacate, supra note 34, at 159.
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public use doctrine, either by legislation or court decision, to persons
who voluntarily devote their land to public use is that they are not
bound to maintain that devotion. An owner may defeat condemnation
of envir6nmentally significant land one day, only to abandon the public
use the next. This shortcoming could be remedied if the courts (or the
legislatures) would create an enforceable public trust of the environ-
mentally significant land after successful invocation of the prior public
use doctrine by the condemnee. A landholder's previous invocation of
the prior public use doctrine in order to save his land from condemna-
tion would estop him from asserting his absolute ownership. and control
of the land. Having successfully asserted the prior public use doctrine
to defeat the condemnation of his land, the landholder (and subsequent
holders of title to the land) would hold the land in trust for the
benefit of the public.
An alternative to the creation of an enforceable public trust would
be the creation of a conservation easement on the owner's property in
favor of the public after the owner's successful implementation of the
prior public use doctrine to defeat condemnation.39
Of course, the owner, knowing that he may defeat condemnation
by invoking the prior public use doctrine, might elect to exploit his
position by offering to sell his land to the condemnor at a higher price
than he would normally obtain through eminent domain. Yet this is
not a serious problem. Should a landholder decide to take advantage
of his position in this manner, the condemning agency will come to
appreciate the increased costs of taking environmentally significant
land and may well be prompted to consider other alternatives.40 In
terms of cost-benefit analysis, there would be a more realistic appraisal
of the costs associated with environmental destruction.
A second approach, short of expanding the prior public use doc-
trine, is suggested by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Texas Eastern
39 In much the same manner that an easement of light or air precludes the owner
of a servient estate from erecting a structure that would interfere with the enjoyment of
that right, the easement in this case would preclude the servient owner from hindering
the environmental significance of the estate.
It cannot be argued that the landholder is thus denied his property rights by either
the trust or easement doctrines. In either case the state had the power to take by eminent
domain; it is only because the property owner himself has declared the trust or created
the easement that the resfriction arises.
40 Legislation such as the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 would
diminish the importance of either the public trust or easement proposals as methods of
ensuring the retention of environmentally significant land since a third party could bring
suit to enjoin environmentally destructive activity without the aid or assistance of the
landholder. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(1) (Current Material 1970). Thus, the land-
holder's bargaining position would be weakened.
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Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc. 41 Although the con-
demnee did not prevail, the court did suggest a standard that may be
useful in the future. In refusing to allow the condemnee to invoke
the prior public use doctrine because of the voluntary nature of its
assumption of public service, the court found that the preserve's dedi-
cation of its land to conservation and wildlife did "invest it with a
special and unique status. '42 The court concluded that "the quantum
of proof required of [the condemnee] to show arbitrariness against it
should not be as substantial as that to be assumed by the ordinary
property owner who devotes his land to conventional uses. ' 43 Under
this standard, in order to establish a taking as prima facie arbitrary the
condemnee must introduce reasonable proof that (1) there will be
serious damage to the environment resulting from the taking, and (2)
there exists a reasonable alternative that would avoid the damage.44
Thus, the court significantly reduced the burden of proof necessary to
defeat condemnation and in so doing facilitated environmental pro-
tection.
CONCLUSION
The proposals reviewed above reflect an allocation and reallocation
of the burden of proof in both of its aspects-the burden of producing
evidence and the burden of persuasion-to the benefit of the environ-
ment. First, the extension of the prior public use doctrine by either the
41 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). For discussions of the case, see McCarter, supra
note 31; Tarlock, Eminent Domain-Review of Route Selection Made by Public Utility
Through Private Wildlife Refuge, 8 NATuRAL R.SOURCES J. 1 (1968).
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, a public utility holding a certificate of
public necessity and convenience issued by the Federal Power Commission, and therefore
possessing the power to exercise eminent domain (15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1964)), desired to
acquire land for a pipeline on the property of Wildlife Preserves, Inc., a private non-profit
corporation dedicated to the acquisition and preservation of land. for conservation pur-
poses. The preserve sought to stop condemnation by invoking the prior public use doctrine.
The New Jersey lower court, however, refused to extend the benefits of that doctrine to
the preserve because of the voluntary nature of its public service. Texas E. Transmission
Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 89 NJ. Super. 1, 213 A.2d 193 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 48 NJ. 261, 225 A.2d 180 (1966).
42 48 N.J. at 268, 225 A.2d at 134.
43 Id. at 278, 225 A.2d at 137.
44 Id. at 275, 225 A.2d at 138.
The New Jersey court noted further that although cost was a factor in determining
whether there was a reasonable alternative, it was a relative and not an absolute factor.
1d. at 276, 225 A.2d at 138-39. See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
854 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 884 U.S. 91 (1966), where the court held that
"in our affluent society, the cost of a project is only one of several factors."
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courts or the legislatures to private owners of environmentally signifi-
cant land would involve transferring the burden of producing evidence
from the condemnee to the condemnor (assuming that prior public use
was not an absolute bar to condemnation). Second, requiring the con-
demnor to prove either no adverse environmental effect or no feasible
alternative places the burden in both aspects on the condemnor.45
Third, the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 and the
New Jersey rule announced in Texas Eastern Transmission transfer the
burden of producing evidence to the condemnor if their requirements
are met.
Allocation of the burden of proof affords the courts a legitimate
and very effective means of protecting environmental interests in con-
demnation proceedings. Moreover, such an allocation is not an infringe-
ment of a legislative function, but an exercise of a traditional judicial
mechanism.40 The courts, 47 as well as the commentators, 48 have often
recognized that one of the important bases for shifting the burden of
proof is public policy. The present allocation of the burden reflects an
outmoded policy of development and industrialization that is no
longer in harmony with today's environmental concerns. 49 Its realloca-
tion would make such environmental concerns a significant factor in
condemnation proceedings. Furthermore, this method of judicial legis-
lation enables courts to advance important public policies with a
45 H.R. RP. No. 1083, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970); see H.R. 19732, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
48 Krier, supra note 28, at 108-09.
47 "Where the burden of proof should rest 'is merely a question of policy and fairness
based on experience in the different situations.'" Rustad v. Great N. Ry., 122 Minn. 453,
456, 142 N.W. 727, 728 (1913), quoting 4 J. WIGmoRE, TREATISE ON EvIDENCE § 2486, at
3524-25 (Ist ed. 1905). (In Rustad, the court created a presumption of negligence where
goods are lost or damaged in the hands of a bailee, thus manipulating the respective
burdens of proof.) See also Denning Warehouse Co. v. Widener, 172 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir.
1949); Paul v. Ribicoff, 206 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D. Colo. 1962).
48 See C. McCoP.xcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 309, at 641 (1954); 9
J. WIGMoRE, TREATIsE ON EvrBENc § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Federal Constitu-
tional Limitations upon Presumptions Created by State Legislation, in HARvARD LEGAL
EssAYS 323, 341 (1934); Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity,
12 STAN. L. Rav. 5, 11-12 (1959); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. Rnv. 51, 60 (1961).
See also Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446, 452-58, 246 A.2d 668, 672-74 (1968);
C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAwv OF CODE PLEADING § 96, at 610 (2d ed. 1947).
49 This common-law preference [for economic productivity] reflected a broad
policy favoring industrial expansion and economic growth at the expense of
natural resource conservation ....
Today, however, conditions are radically different. Yet the burden rule, the
justifications for its existence largely dead and gone, lives on ....
Krier, supra note 28, at 107-08.
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minimum of controversy.50 The courts may therefore manipulate the
burden of proof as the needs of society change5 1-indeed, the rationale
underlying imposing such a burden compels them to do So.52
Terry Calvani
50 Id. at 108.
51 The common law is a living process. Like all things that have the-principle of
life in them, its evolution is marked by trial and error. It is moulded and adapted
to an ultimate end. That end is justice, imperfect by the limitations of human-
kind yet lighted by the divine spark of creative thinking. Struggling ever forward,
the common law like nature finds many decisions no longer in consonance with its
needs and ruthlessly overrules or differentiates them until like a species no longer
in harmony with its environment the decisions tested by the needs of the times
and found wanting are declared dead.
Schneider, The Presumptive Rule of Negligence or When Do the Facts Speak, 13 B.U.L.
RFv. 50 (1933) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also O.W. HOLMES, Tim COMMON
LAw 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963), where the author notes that "[t]he life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time .. "
For a good discussion of nuisance law relating to pollution, with attendant manipula-
tions of the burden of proof, see Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology,
Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 616-20 (1969).
52 If public policy and the needs of the times are to continue to allocate the burden
of proof, then the preservation of environmental quality requires a change in condemna-
tion procedure now.
When times were different, the march of progress, as progress was then under-
stood, demanded that industrial and commercial development take precedence
over conservation, as that term is now understood . ..
O .. ur ancestors fought the wilderness. We are, belatedly, fighting for it.
Brief for Appellant at 22-23, Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48
N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966) (emphasis in original).
